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Abstrak 
 
Fokus kajian ini adalah untuk mengenalpasti bagaimana amalan pengurusan pembekal 
dapat mengubah perhubungan antara faktor konteksual dan pencapaian pembekal. 
Faktor konteksual yang dipilih ialah “power asymmetry” dan intensity persaingan. 
Tinjauan yang dilakukan menggunakan sebuah firma pengilangan dalam bidang 
telekomunikasi. Data diperolehi daripda 100 orang pekerja daripada beberapa lokasi 
dalam firma ini. Kesemua perkerja ini ada penglibatan dengan pembekal. Cara 
analisis yang dikemuka oleh Baron dan Kenny (1986) yang melibatkan empat langkah 
telah digunakan untuk menentukan kesan pengubahsuaian. Hasil kajian dijangka 
dapat menyumbang kepada karya mengenai pengurusan pembekal berasaskan faktor 
konteksual. Dari segi aspek pengurusan pula, pengetahuan ini berupaya 
menungkatkan pemahaman mengenai mengapa sesetengah organisasi lebih berjaya 
berbanding dengan yang lain dari segi pencapaian pembekal. Penemuan menunjukkan 
bahawa amalan kerja penglibatan tinggi merupakan pembolehubah pencelahan yang 
mempengaruhi perhubungan antara intensiti persaingan dan pencapaian kualiti 
pembekal. Ia memberikan kesan pencelahan separa dalam perhubungan antara intesiti 
persaingan dan fleksibiliti pembekal. Walaubagaimanapaun perhubungann ini negatif 
yang mencadangkan bahawa organisasi kajian tidak mengamalkan amalan HIWP 
dengan berkesan. Bagaimanapun apabila HIWP digunakan dalam persekitaran yang 
kompetitif, hubungan negatif ini berkurangan. Penemuan kajian ini menyokong 
penemuan lampau mengenai kebergunaan amalan HIWP kepada pencapaian. Kedua-
dua amalan HIWP dan amalan transaksi ekonomi digunakan secara serentak bila 
persaingan adalah sengit. Sekatan kemasukan menyebabkan pembeli lebih bergantung 
kepada pembekal. 
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Abstract 
The focus of this study is to observe how supplier management practices alter the 
equation of organizational context and supplier performance. The contexts selected 
are power asymmetry and competition intensity. The survey was conducted in a 
telecommunication hardware manufacturer. 100 key informants who deal with 
suppliers were sampled from multiple sites of the multinational. The four-step 
analysis method by Baron and Kenny (1986) is used to determine the mediating 
effect. The result is expected to contribute towards literature on contextual based 
supplier management. On management aspect, knowledge is supposed to enhance 
understanding of why some organizations are more successful than others in getting 
good performance from suppliers. The findings showed that high involvement work 
practices mediated the influence of competition intensity on supplier’s quality 
performance and partially mediated the effect competition intensity has on supplier’s 
flexibility. However the influences were negatively related prompting a suggestion 
that the organization under study did not practice HIWP well. However when HIWP 
was applied in a competitive environment, the negative effect was mitigated. The 
findings support past studies on the usefulness of HIWP on supplier performance. 
Both HIWP and economics transactional practices were simultaneously applied when 
competition was intense. High entry barrier caused buyers to be more dependent on 
suppliers 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Why is Supplier’s Performance Important? 
Application of management theory starts within organization. As environment 
becomes more competitive and application skills become more mature internally, 
organization starts to look outside the organization to strengthen its competitiveness. 
Supply chain management is relative new in management history. Supply chain starts 
from supplier at one end to customer at the other end.  Material cost is approximately 
60~70% of product cost for an average manufacturing organization. Purchasing and 
supplier quality personnel often lament on the poor line of sight in supplier operation 
especially when the suppliers are located abroad. A close watch on supplier’s 
performance is the priority of an organization. Organization that manages suppliers 
well enjoy core competency which is hard to emulate by competitors. Figure 1.1 
shows the comparison of an average company against top-in-class company in 
inventory turns and revenue. When one mentions success story in supply chain, 
stories of companies like Dell, Wal-Mart and Tesco immediately surfaces. These top 
flight companies spent 4% of revenue in supply chain against 10% from average 
companies. In year 2001, Dell inventory is four days against HP’s 24 (Cook & 
Greenspan, 2003). These are real statistics compiled from industries which show case 
how good supplier management improves operating margin. 
Suppliers are external to organization, whose output, the organization relies on 
to complete a product. Traditionally they are those supplying raw materials, 
components, production equipment and consumable materials. Lately they are further 
processing subcontractors, service providers and information providers. Supplier’s 
performance affects several aspects of organization. Product cost, quality and lead 
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time to market are some of the impacts. A manufacturing organization purchases parts 
and assembles them into systems according to bill of materials. Bill of materials can 
run for 10,000 parts for an automotive to 3 for a plastic injection molder.  
  
Figure 1.1. Comparison of average company against top- in-class in inventory turns 
and revenue to demonstrate the power of supply chain management. 
It is impossible for buying firm to understand the characteristics of each part well. 
Suppliers are usually experts in their own products. Buying firm depends on 
suppliers’ technical knowledge and application expertise to provide design guidelines, 
failure analysis and material testing support (Tan, Kannan & Handfield, 1998). Early 
supplier involvement in product development allows an organization to shorten 
launching lead time. Successful organizations are often strategically, operationally 
and technologically integrated with their suppliers. Outsourcing activity is increasing 
lately. Organization outsource because it can focus resources on core competence. 
Thus suppliers that specialize in whatever field they are good at enjoy economy of 
scale to invest in specialized equipment to produce product of cheaper and better 
quality.  It is very common among industrial buyer to ask for annual committed cost 
reduction. Supplier has to master the skill of continuous improvement in order to do 
business with industrial buyers. Toyota, which adopts an admired manufacturing 
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approach, believes in reduced supplier based. Only one or two suppliers are selected 
for each component to reduce variances in piece part. Supplier is given life of product 
contract. In this kind of supply chain environment, failure in the supplier’s product is 
really unimaginable. 
As recent as year 2000, research still reported that most buying firms feel the 
needs of supplier improvement in the areas of delivery, cost reduction, product 
quality, new technology adoption, financial health and product design. Buyers also 
feel that these deficiencies in capabilities probably hinder suppliers from competing in 
the markets. For example, according to a survey done by Bain and Company in 2003, 
85% of senior executives in U.S. admitted that supply chain management was their 
top priority, however less than 10% ever tracked their suppliers’ performances. The 
reason of such poor record was due to poor visibility of supplier performance as well 
as incorrect reward type was given to supply chain executives. A typical buyer is 
rewarded for preventing stock out but goes un-noticed although supplier inventory 
turns improves (Cook & Greenspan, 2003). 
Only large organization e.g. multinational corporation (MNC) can afford to do 
supplier management. When venturing overseas, MNC has the social obligation to 
develop local suppliers and to improve overall skills of the host country. Success of 
the supplier is tied to the development and pride of the country. If the MNC has 
strategic intent in the host country, performances of these local suppliers are closely 
tied to its operation strategy. Thoo’s (2004) study in supplier-buyer relationship in 
Malaysia showed that there was a distinct gap between MNC and local companies. 
The latter still need serious catch up in supplier management when compared to 
foreign invested companies. 
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The proliferation of quality awards such as Malcolm Baldridge National 
Quality Awards (MBNQA) in Unite States, Deming Prize in Japan, European Quality 
Awards Model (EFQM) in Europe draw attention to the need of totality in supply 
chain where supplier is an important element. To win these prestigious prizes, it is of 
organization’s interest that the supplier does well. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Paragraph 1.1 summarizes the benefits of supplier performance. However 
often buying firms are reluctant to commit resources on supplier management due to 
no immediate benefit and a mentality of quick change in supplier pool. This is 
aggravated by large organization which enjoys power advantage against its suppliers. 
Very often buying organization introduces programs that take advantage of suppliers. 
Examples of these programs are supplier manage inventory, annual cost reduction, 
electronic data management and bar-coding procedure that only benefit buyer. 
Mediated power relationship is bad for the buying organization (Maloni & Benton, 
2000; Molm, Petersen & Takahashi, 1999). Power disadvantage suppliers are not 
always submersible; they seek method to rebalance the power asymmetry.  
Conventional interpretation often assumes conflict free relationship between buyer 
and supplier. Knights and McCabe (2002) argued that real dyad relationship involves 
power struggle. Buying organizations that believe in benefits of supplier management 
and recognize the ever changing buyer-supplier dynamics could adopt management 
practices that build loyal supplier.  
When input effort does not yield result, competition could be an explanation. 
When facing similar organizational contexts, some organizations do better than others 
in managing suppliers. Practices implemented by these companies must have made 
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the difference. Large organization is bureaucratic and likes to rely on factual indices 
to make decision. Economics transactional practice is built into management 
accounting and has been a management decision tool for years.  Involvement 
practices are supported by past literatures as better tactics to retain loyal suppliers. 
Perception of such commitment from buying firm has profound impact on supplier’s 
engagement. However they are unique to the buyer-supplier dyad and need time to 
develop. 
There is a time lag between organizational context and management practices, 
if the study is centre on context, practice and performance, it is appropriate to put 
practice as the mediator. The study intends to explore tactical approaches that allow 
better management of suppliers for sustainable results. 
The problem statement is how do supplier management practices mediate the 
adverse effect of power imbalance and competition intensity on suppliers’ 
performances. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
This study intends to fulfill the following objectives: 
1. To determine the influence of supplier management practices on supplier 
performance in industrial purchasing. 
2. To determine the relationship between power asymmetry and competition 
intensity against supplier performance when mediated by supplier 
management practices. 
3. To investigate the effect of competition intensity on the adoption of power 
asymmetry approach from buyer’s perspective. 
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1.4 Research Questions 
This study adopts a direct formula of what organization context affect supplier 
performance when mediated by supplier management practices. The study intends to 
address following questions: 
1. What is the choice of supplier management practices when product is critical 
to buying organization? 
2. When product is critical to buying organization, does buyer adopt high power 
asymmetry strategy? 
3. Do Involvement Practices and Economics Transactional Practices influence 
supplier performance? 
4. Which supplier management practice is preferred when power imbalance 
favor buying firm? 
5. Which supplier management practice is preferred when buying firm faces high 
degree of market competition? 
6. Does competition intensity influence the demonstration of power relationship? 
7. Does supplier management practices mediating the effect of high power 
imbalance and high competition intensity on supplier performances? 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
Research into buyer-supplier’s relationship is very recent when compared to 
the management theory. Initially it emerged as a little area of knowledge in quality 
system management principles. Gradually it grew to become a body of knowledge by 
itself when the phrase supply chain management (SCM) was coined. This study seek 
to confirm the inter relationship of context, practice and performance. It helps to 
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clarify some gap exist in the literature of power relationship and supplier 
performance. 
Automotive industry is where most of the buyer-supplier literature is anchored 
(Gonzalez-Benito & Dale, 2001; Nobeoka, Dyer & Madhok, 2002; Park, Hartley & 
Wilson, 2001). Other industries do not look particularly interested in supplier 
research. From the methodology view point, supplier management originates from 
practitioners’ needs, thus case study and normative approach are very common. Both 
lack the rigor required by academic research because its findings cannot be 
generalized. This study will survey suppliers for the telecommunication hardware 
industry. Practices in this industry can be easily extended to other electronic industry. 
Electronics industry is a worthy watch because of its short historical perspective and 
its peculiarity of short life cycle, protocol adherence and shifting nature which does 
not give advantage to any incumbent. 
A review into literature as tabled in Table 2.4 shows that there are many 
studies assessing practices against performance as well as context against 
performances. This research adds on to the study of Mohd Ikram (2002) by 
introducing context of power relationship as well as economics transaction practices 
into the model. It is the belief that buying organization introduces appropriate 
practices to mitigate the adverse effect of organizational context the organization is 
subjected too. Thus context and practices is expected to have longitudinal 
relationship. Similarly practices adopted take time to demonstrate their effects. This 
study probes deeper by reviewing the mediating effect of supplier management 
practices in the relationship of power relationship and competition against supplier 
performances. This helps to explain why under same power and competition context, 
some suppliers perform better than others. 
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From managerial perspective, knowledge gained from this study should 
convince buying organization to allocate resources for supplier management. It 
confirms that proper supplier management practices could mitigate the negative effect 
of organizational context on supplier performances.  
 
1.6 Definition of Variables 
According to the research objectives, the main block of variables are 
organizational context leading to supplier management practices that produce 
performances. Definitions of key terms are listed as follows.  
1.6.1 Supplier Management Practices 
Supplier management encompasses planning, implementing, developing, and 
monitoring company relationships with current and potential supplier. It functions to 
organize the optimal flow of high quality, value for money materials to manufacturing 
companies from a suitable set of innovative supplier (Wagner, 2003).  
An involved management practices include establishing a systemic process 
that involve people; providing appropriate level of empowerment, an interdependent 
organization structure. The core practices required are information sharing, skill of 
supplier, accountability and processes. (Krause, Scannell & Calantone, 2000). 
Supplier-buying organization is highly dependent on economic transaction as 
motivation for further commitment. Practices referred to are competitive pressure 
when more than one supplier is used for a material which allows switching. The 
second practice is supplier incentives whereby supplier is given the carrot of more 
business for return of good performances (Monczka, Trent, & Callahan, 1993). 
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1.6.2 Organization Context 
Organization context are internal or external organization contingency that is 
not directly controllable. Examples of contextual variables are size, product, industry, 
intensity of competition, length of supplier-buyer relationship, tier of supplier, power 
asymmetry etc. 
Power asymmetry is seen as inverse function of relative dependence between 
buyer and supplier and the corresponding strategy adopted to manage the relationship 
(Anderson & Narus, 1990; Emerson, 1996). Power bases are mediated and non 
mediated.  
Competition intensity is defined as degree of market rivalry. When there are 
many suppliers of the same product, degree of rivalry for supplier is high, thus 
competition intensity is high. Competition is a function of barrier of entry and degree 
of differentiation. Typical characteristics of high competition intensity are short 
product life cycle, critical customer demand on cost and quality and rapid product 
launch. 
1.6.3 Supplier Performances 
Supplier performance has multiple definitions depending on the objectives of 
buying organization. They can be straight accounting measurement such as cost, first 
pass yield, asset management (Sakakibara, 1995). Others prefer to use a basket of 
integrated measurement including delivery reliability, responsiveness, flexibility, cost, 
assets management efficiency, customer service, productivity and quality (Supply 
Chain Council, n.d.; Gunasekaran, Patel & Tirtiroglu, 2001; Lambert & Pohlen, 
2001). 
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1.7 Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 is introduction which 
explains the background of the study, historical perspective, problem statement and 
objective. Chapter 2 reviews recent literature available on the topic and identify the 
missing gap. Then a research framework is proposed. It shows relationship between 
dependent and independent as well as moderator. Chapter 3 shows the methodology 
adopted in the research. Chapter 4 reports the findings and analysis and chapter 5, 
discussion and conclusion. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Review of knowledge in supplier performance follows the schematic shown in 
Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1. Schematic diagram of supplier performance review. 
2.1 Historical Aspect of Supplier Management Application 
Thirty years ago, supplier quality is synonymous with stringent outgoing 
inspection. Quality is the very first aspect the buying organization expects. In the 
early days, supplier management is equivalent to supplier quality management. 
Buying organization would compile a list of criteria very close to the ISO9000 
certification when selecting a supplier. This practice persists until today. However as 
time passed by, other criteria slowly crop up in the selection checklist such as 
delivery, cost, flexibility and early product development involvement. 
In the 80’s the Japanese successfully penetrated the European and the US 
markets with quality but reasonably priced products. They did this with their unique 
supplier management system ala the Toyota style. This was an awakening call for US 
companies. Supplier development, certification, competitive enforcing and incentive 
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were put up as remedial packages. In the 90’s some of these fix all packages blipped 
on the radar and disappeared. In the late 90’s both researchers and practitioners 
realized there were no fix all packages. Systems and practices must be implemented, 
contingent on other supporting context. Introduction of this idea corresponding to a 
movement of reducing supplier base which reduces part variation and improve 
product quality.  
From industry perspective, automotive is the first industry to drive 
improvement not only in the first tier but also the second and the third tier suppliers. It 
is driven by needs because any recall involve automobiles could possibly bankrupt 
any supplier besides putting a bad name for the company. Practices from automobiles 
industry has been adopted in electronics. The unique point of electronic industry is its 
necessity to conform to product protocol and part interchangeability. Thus its 
suppliers have to produce within a narrow specification window which in turn 
requires a better process control. 
Corresponding to the above development, the relationship between suppliers 
and buying organizations change from animosity to cordial partnership. A few papers 
have shown that power tactics only bring short term improvement. Partnership is a 
form of elevated strategy. 
 
2.2 Research in Supplier Management 
Rungtusanathan, Choi, Hollingworth, Wu and Forza (2003) did a meta 
analysis on 285 research articles in operations management published between 1980 
and 2000 covering six operations management journal. Their research showed that 
research in operations management showed exponential increase since 1995 and 
supply chain management stood out as showing fastest ascendancy to prominence. 
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There are several streams of research in supplier management. Since supplier 
management is pretty new phenomena and originated from the industry, early 
literatures were concerned with the implementation. Implementation literatures from 
1990 to 1996 were normally compiled by practitioners who were heavily influenced 
by implementation experiences and were highly prescriptive. Dean and Bowen 
(1994), Powell (1995) and Hackman and Wageman (1995) are the exceptions. Their 
empirical papers carry academic rigor which are founded on management theories but 
have yet to be fully tested. One problem is the difficulty to operationalize results of 
implementation. This leads to second stream of research, measurement. Researchers 
argue which measurement indices best measure the implementation success. Short 
term achievement such as product quality, delivery and cost are proposed. The 
Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award (MBNQA) criteria is an instrument often 
used to assess maturity of an organization because its conceptual framework 
addresses the principal domains of good business model. Throughout the years, the 
award criteria have been repeatedly updated by experts (Dean & Bowen, 1994). 
However MBNQA does not adequately evaluate an organization’s quality culture, 
active leadership, quality cost and supplier management (Sila & Ebrahimpour, 2003). 
More practical measurements are using cost of accounting and a string of supply 
chain metrics (Gunasekaran, Patel & Tirtiroglu, 2001; Lambert & Pohlen, 2001; 
Supply Chain Council, n.d.). When organization starts to face competitive 
environment, integration of supplier becomes very crucial. Indices such as volume 
flexibility, new product launch, joint research and development becomes long term 
measurement. Some examples of literature in this area are Talluri, Vickery and Droge 
(2003); Chan and Qi (2003).  
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After the late 1990s, it was recognized that supplier management could not be 
isolated from other business practices. The third stream of researches discusses what 
practices are best suitable to develop suppliers. These practices are tied to some 
management principles, e.g. organization that believes in control management asks its 
supplier to inspect the products before delivery. Organizations who believe in 
empowerment are more likely to install organic like governance structure. Some of 
the papers in this area are Forker (1997); Krause, Scannell and Calantone (2000); 
Ramdas and Spekman (2000); Shin, Collier and Wilson (2000); Romano (2002) and 
Hult, Ketchen Jr. and Slater (2004). 
However very soon researchers realized that the same practices did not 
necessary ended with the same performance. Thus the fourth stream of study 
appeared. Sousa and Voss (2003) used different context of OEM and subcontracting 
businesses to explain type of process monitoring tools most effective. Krause (1997) 
compared the effectiveness of direct firm involvement, incentives and enforced 
competition as factors affecting supplier performance.  
From soft aspect, supplier management borrows extensively from marketing 
literature to debate the element of buyer-supplier relationship and impact on 
performance. Extensive studies into trust, information exchange and commitment 
using distribution channel produces valuable insights into dyadic relationship. 
Example of these literatures are Buchanan (1992); Fynes and Voss (2002); Ganesan 
(1994); Gassenheimer, Houston and Manolis (2004); Heide (1994); Kalwani and 
Narayandas (1995); Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp (1995); Lusch and Brown (1996); 
Mohd. Ikram (2002); Pagell and Sheu (2000) as well as Thoo (2004). A higher level 
of buyer-supplier dyadic relationship is buyer investment into assets specificity and 
supplier involvement in new product development. Using automotive industry as a 
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backdrop, researchers look at utilizing supplier expertise as product co-developers 
(Von Corswant, Wynstra & Wetzels, 2003; Echtelt, Von Wynstra, van Weele & 
Duyters, 2004). 
Discussing dyadic relationship from trust, communication and commitment 
promotes comfortable feeling from both parties. There is another dim side of the 
relationship which is an uneasy point in buyer-supplier relationship, i.e. power 
asymmetry. The concept of power asymmetry dated back to 1960’s. It was in the late 
1990’s, power relationship was studied in the buyer-supplier dyad (Maloni & Benton, 
2000; Mohd. Ikram, 2002; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Sivadas & Dwyer, 2000). Power 
asymmetry is inevitable in dyadic relationship and is generally destructive if not 
applied properly. 
 
2.3 Theories in Supplier Management 
Supplier management can be looked at from two aspects: microeconomics or 
behavioral.  The phenomena seen in these two aspects can be explained by three 
theories as follows.  
2.3.1 Transaction Cost Theory 
Transaction cost theory views relation between supplier and buying firm 
through a governance structure that enables economic transaction. Transaction cost 
includes cost of searching for information, cost of contract monitoring and 
enforcement. The dimensions involved are transaction-specific investment and 
internal and external uncertainty. Transaction specific investment involves physical or 
human assets that are tied to a particular buyer-supplier’s firm. This premise gives rise 
to the safeguarding issue where the transaction mechanism is designed to minimize 
risk of opportunistic exploitation. In managing supply risk, Agency Theory is adopted 
  16
where buying organization proactively assess supplier risk through quality indices, 
improve processes and reduce supply disruption. The aim is to verify supplier’s 
behaviors, and align goals of buyers and suppliers, thus reducing uncertainty 
(Zsidisin, Ellram, Carter & Cavinato, 2004). External uncertainty is when 
environment is unpredictable that does not allow specification ex ante into contract. 
Adaptation issue arises that require mechanism for flexibility when the event unfolds. 
Internal uncertainty poses evaluation problem whether contract compliance has been 
met. The result is the crafting of unilateral trading relationship that integrates all 
functions to provide a framework for safeguarding, adaptation and evaluation 
capabilities. Bilateral trading relationship is also being proposed to minimize potential 
governance problems (Ring & van De Ven, 1992; Heide, 1994). 
2.3.2 Social Exchange Theory 
From the behavioral aspect, Social Exchange Theory by Emerson and Cook 
(1978, as cited in Social Exchange Theory, n.d.) recognizes that the exchange of 
material and social resources are fundamental forms of human interaction. Social 
exchange theory could explain the extent of inter-dependence between buyer and 
supplier. However it lacks antecedent conditions. Thus resource dependent theory fills 
up this gap. Resource dependence theory views inter-firm governance as a strategic 
response towards uncertainty and dependence. No organization is completely self 
sufficient and during decision making there is always an element of uncertainty.  All 
these have to be mitigated through inter-firm relationship through formal or informal 
links with other firms. Even though resource dependence theory is clear on the 
variables of uncertainty and dependence, it lacks specific mechanism to govern the 
relationship (Heide, 1994). 
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2.3.3 Relational Contracting Theory 
The third theory is a combination of the above two; relational contracting 
theory compares discrete versus relational exchange. Discrete exchange assumes 
individual transaction independent of past and future relations and constitutes just the 
transfer of goods between contracting parties. Relational exchange, on the other hand, 
accounts for the historical and social context in which transaction takes place. 
Enforcement of obligation is of mutual interest for the contracting parties. Deviance is 
dealt with in a proactive manner. This theory captures the spirit of bilateral 
governance. This theory recognizes the need for adapting relationship in changing 
environments (Heide, 1994). 
Heide (1994) recognized the need of all two typology of market governance, 
unilateral and bilateral governances. He did one step further to propose models of 
implementation of these three forms of governance. It is a three step model covering 
initiation, maintenance and termination. The content of the model describes the 
practices commonly seen in operation of supplier management. It is summarized in 
Table 2.1. 
2.4 Concept of Supplier Management 
Before discussing supplier management, one needs to understand supply chain 
management (SCM). SCM and supplier management has been used interchangeably. 
SCM encompass all aspect of delivering products to customers, while supplier 
management emphasizes the inter-organizational relations known as buyer-supplier 
relationships (Paulraj & Chen, 2005). Operational wise, supplier management can be 
viewed at from three angles: management of the supplier which includes supplier 
selection and supplier base reduction; supplier development i.e. long term 
development of supplier capabilities and finally supplier integration (Wagner, 2003). 
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Table 2.1 
Model proposed by Heidi (1994) for implementing supplier management 
 
Governance Market Governance Non market Governance 
Dimension  Unilateral/ Hierarchical Bilateral 
1.Relationship 
Initiation 
No particular initiation 
process 
Selective entry; skill 
training 
Selective entry; value 
training 
2.Relationship 
Maintenance 
   
2.1Role 
specification 
Individual roles applied 
to individual 
transactions 
Individual roles applied to 
entire relationship 
Overlapping roles; joint 
activities and team 
responsibilities 
2.2Nature of 
Planning 
Nonexistence; or 
limited to individual 
transactions 
Proactive/unilateral; 
binding contingency plans 
Proactive/joint; plans 
subject to change 
2.3 Nature of 
Adjustments 
Nonexistent; or giving 
rise to exit or 
immediate 
compensation 
Ex ante/explicit 
mechanism for change 
Bilateral/predominantly 
negotiated changes 
through mutual 
adjustment 
2.4Monitoring 
Procedures 
External/ reactive; 
measurement of output 
External/reactive; 
measurement of output 
and behavior 
Internal/proactive; 
based on self-control 
2.5 Incentive System Short-term; tied to 
output 
Sort and long term; tied to 
output and behavior 
Long-term; tied to 
display of system 
relevant attitudes 
2.6Means of 
Enforcement 
External to the 
relationship; legal 
system/ competition/ 
offsetting investment 
Internal to the 
relationship; legitimate 
authority 
Internal to the 
relationship; mutuality 
of interest 
3.Relationship 
Termination 
Completion of discrete 
transaction 
Fixed relationship length, 
or explicit mechanisms 
for termination 
Open-ended 
relationship 
 
There are two objectives for supplier management. First is to reduce cost, 
improve quality, delivery and expedite time to market. The second is to teach 
suppliers a systematic process that they can use for continuous improvement. Buying 
organization expects suppliers to be self sufficient in continuing improvement effort 
(Hartley & Choi, 1996). Buying organization has four alternatives when suppliers are 
not performing. (1) Invest resources to improve supplier performance; (2) take back 
the product to build it in house; (3) select an alternative supplier and (4) a 
combination of all above. Alternative (1) supplier development, is a more rational 
option when buying firm has vested interest in the supplier. 
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Through iterative research, several models have been proposed for supplier 
association. Each adds on to the previous one to produce a model which is contingent 
to certain organizational needs. They are as follows (Hines & Rich, 1998): 
The structural model is where buying organization creates a network of higher 
performance suppliers. Suppliers are benchmarked against the best in their class. 
Supplier is coached to achieve action plans. The second model is the efficiency 
model. The essence is the same as the structural model. However, buying organization 
is included in the benchmarking too because in a lot of time, buying organization is no 
better than the suppliers. The third model is the network sourcing model. This is a tier 
based supply chain management very popular in Japan. The model is geared towards 
cost reduction, quality, delivery and new product processes. The fourth type is the 
value stream model. It covers both internal and external supply chain. Buying 
organizations set performance measures for the teams managing those suppliers. The 
team then decides the best measure and work closely with supplier to achieve both the 
internal and external goals. An enhancement to the previous model is the extended 
value stream model. This is a multi-tiered structure involving suppliers and their 
vendors. It includes raising awareness, education and training, and improvement. The 
structure is complex and requires a dedicated supplier management team. The sixth 
model is the network development model. This consists of buying organization 
identifying a few suppliers that the organization likes to see more consistent 
performance and apply high involvement practices on the suppliers. The last model is 
the extended network development model. This is the same as network development 
model but extended to include a group of buying organizations that have common 
supply need for a product or service. The suppliers are benchmarked and the buying 
organizations collectively facilitate the suppliers achieving the resulting action plan. 
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Supplier development is one component within supplier management. Supplier 
development programs are more common in large organizations which see the need to 
have one. When looking at the supplier development programs of various 
multinationals, they are commonly adapted from established quality management 
system. The approach is generic, prescriptive and strictly from buyers’ perspective 
rather than suppliers’ perspective. 
The various models available to establish supplier management coincides with 
the sophistication developed in supplier management over time. They also explain an 
organization has different needs of supplier association at various development 
phases. Nowadays supplier management tends to be broad scoped with varying 
emphasis and do not conform to a definite format.  
In 1996, sensing the difficulty faced by the industry in managing the supply 
chain for results, Supply Chain Council (SCC) endorsed a model called Supply-Chain 
Operations Reference-Model (SCOR) as a broad scope integrated model governing 
the entire supply for competitive advantage. Supplier management is definitely an 
important link in the chain. Figure 1 shows the SCOR model which consists of five 
phase: plan, source, make, deliver and return. Supplier management is tied to buying 
organization and supplier as well as supplier’s supplier. This model is process 
decomposition based, across horizontally and vertically along the supply chain. Each 
process is composed of process elements which allow for reconfiguration. The 
activities closely follows the resource based view, internalization-externalization 
framework and dependent theory. According to the resource based view, 
organizations possess package of knowledge which they apply to their advantage. 
Capable organizations internalize core competencies and externalize non core 
competencies. When organizations outsource their non core competencies, they are 
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depending on third parties to complete competitive advantages they may glen from 
their supply chain management. Thus develop suppliers’ capability becomes omni 
critical. 
 
Figure 2.2. SCOR model 
While supplier performance is getting more prominent in organizational 
strategy, there are opinions that cast pessimistic view against depending on suppliers 
alone to accomplish competitive advantage in supply chain. Monczka, Trent and 
Callahan (1993) suggested that while organizations developed their suppliers, they 
also aggressively implemented better sourcing and purchasing strategies. Suppliers 
were not meeting expectation of buying organizations for future needs and 
capabilities without intervention from buyers. As such, buying organizations treated 
supplier development as a black hole. Only large firms were involved in supplier 
development. The focus on supplier development was likely to be short term 
performance targeted rather than capability targeted (Watts & Hahn, 1993). 
While above rhetoric is one aspect of supplier management, Hartley and Choi 
(1996) opined that buying organizations have inborn advantage in pushing through 
improvement activities among their suppliers. Suppliers would find means to 
accommodate changes required by customers. Customers’ demand legitimized the 
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need to change and generally overcome the suppliers’ organizational inertia that tends 
to resist change.  
 
2.5 Supplier Performance Measurement 
2.5.1 Objectives 
Once organizations implement suppliers’ development plans, they expect 
results. Supplier performance becomes critical review information. Buying 
organization expects quality product delivered at the required time at reasonably 
prices. Buying organization also expects suppliers to react according to the flexibility 
demanded by the market and diligently participate in new product development. A 
bonus point will be when a supplier actually adds value to normal supply chain 
expectation. Example of this value added activities are contributing to better product 
or process knowledge, providing testing facilities, absorbing risk of logistics and 
distribution process.  
2.5.2 Ineffective Measurement 
It is a common error that supplier performance is ineffectively measured 
causing obstacle to supplier management. For example, calculation of profit and loss 
of a business unit is determined by accounting procedure. Buyer’s performance is 
measured from the ability to prevent stock out in the buying firm rather than inventory 
reduction at supplier. Range of potential supplier management issues to be measured 
is larger than profit and loss statement (Dunn & Young, 2004). 
Shin, Collier and Wilson (2000) argued that measuring supplier alone was 
insufficient. The same argument is supported by Supply Chain Council (n.d.); 
Gunasekaran, Patel and Tirtiglo (2001) as well as Lambert and Pohlen (2001). The 
research of Shin, Collier and Wilson (2000) went further by including a framework 
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that measured both supplier’s performance and buyer’s performance. Supplier’s 
performance was measured using indices proposed in the above mentioned 
paragraphs. Buyer’s performance was measured by product quality, delivery, 
flexibility and cost. These three teams of researchers proposed an integrated supply 
chain. They concurred that establishing metrics for supplier was difficult because 
supplier was part of an integrated supply chain with overlapping functions with buyer 
and its own supplier. There is a lack of a widely accepted definition for supply chain 
management too. Nevertheless they agreed that the metrics should be process based 
covering the entire supply chain rather than functional based as the traditional way. 
The important point is to align performance along the objectives of all members in the 
supply chain and convince each member to work collaboratively to generate mutual 
gains and savings. This means the measurement should encompass cost accounting 
and strings of other functional indices such as customer satisfaction, productivity, 
quality, assets utilization, timeliness etc. 
2.5.3 Common Measuring Indices 
Most researches in supply chain management and supplier management used 
indices such as quality, delivery, cost, lead time, supplier rating and flexibility as 
measurement indices (Forker, 1997; Kanji & Wong, 1999; Khaw, 1999; Krause, 
Scannell & Calantone, 2000; Mohd. Ikram, 2002; Shin, Collier & Wilson, 2000). 
Some used economic terns such as revenue and market success (Ramdas & Spekman, 
2000; Talluri, Vickery, & Droge, 2003; Tan, Kannan, & Handfield, 1998). Others 
looked at the soft side such as satisfaction, relationship index, propensity to leave etc. 
(Gassenheimer, Houston & Manolis, 2004; Krause & Ellram, 1997).  
Walter, Muller, Helfert and Ritter (2003) used a unique concept of functional 
fulfillment as measure of relationship quality. They said that supplier’s fulfillment of 
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direct and indirect relationship functions for the customer improved customer’s 
perception on relationship quality. Latest stream of researches saw new product 
development as the management scope and measuring indices such as supplier 
involvement started to appear (Laseter & Ramdas, 2002; Loo, 2002; McGinnis & 
Vallopra, 2001). SCOR model level 1 sets the fundamental of measurement. It 
measures customer interface and internal interface. The indices used are reliability, 
responsiveness, flexibility, cost and assets. The full performance metrics is shown in 
Figure 2.3.  
  Customer-Facing Internal-Facing 
Performance Attribute Reliability Responsiveness Flexibility Cost Assets 
Delivery performance 3     
Fill rate 3     
Perfect order fulfillment 3     
Order fulfillment lead time  3    
Supply-chain response time   3   
Production flexibility   3   
Supply chain management cost    3  
Cost of goods sold    3  
Value-added productivity    3  
Warranty cost or return s processing cost   3  
Cash-to-cash cycle time     3 
Inventory days of supply     3 
Asset turns     3 
 
Figure 2.3. Full performance metrics of SCOR model process level 1 (Supply Chain 
Council, n.d.) 
2.6 Empirical Models 
There are several models presented on the research of buyer-supplier 
relationships. Dimensions discussed in these models have positive correlation 
between the dimensions and compliment each other in buyer-supplier relationship. 
